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The Federal Common Law of
Patent Licensing
by Stuart H. Nissim

The Constitution and Congressional legislation grant certain exclusive rights to
inventors of new and useful articles. This
collection of rights is known as a United
States patent.! For a limited time these
inventors can use their rights to seek a
return for the sweat and money that they
invested in the invention by excluding all
others from making, using or selling their .
invention.
There are several profit making options
available to the owner of a patent:
(1) The patent owner may manufacture
and market the invention himself, excluding competition and accumulating the
profits as a result of the lack of competition; or
(2) The patent owner may sell the
patent, and the rights that go with it outright, eliminating the risk and work
involved in the marketing of the product;2
or
(3) The patent owner can contractually
authorize others to use all or part of the
patent in exchange for the payment of
royalties. These licensing and payment
arrangements may assume any number of
configurations. The patent owner may
authorize the use of the patent to a
number of licensees, which is called a nonexclusive license, or may limit the use to
one sole licensee, which is called an exclusive license. 3 The patent owner may
license just one or any combination of the
rights which the patent grants. The licensor may also restrict the extent of the use
by the licensee. 4
Such licenses are contracts. 5 Because contracts are generally governed by state law,

one could conclude that patent licenses are
governed by state law. Absent express federal statute·s on point, this is generally the
case. At times, however, a patent owner's
freedom of contract may be preempted.by
policy considerations of the federal patent
system.
There is a growing collection of federal
cases addressing patent licensing contracts
which do not apply the substantive law of
the forum state, but instead apply federal
common law.
Section I of this article discusses the substantive law to be applied in patent licensing cases and the principles and sources of
federal common law. Section II presents
the development of the federal policy
upon which the federal common law of
patent licensing relies for its authority.
The next two sections present an analysis
of some of the Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit cases which establish the federal
common law of patent licensing. The fifth
section briefly discusses the proposed federal legislation which would codify some
of the principles of the federal common
law of patent licensing.
I

COMMON IAW OF CONTRACTSFEDERAL OR STATE?
When Mr. Tompkins bumped into a
train in Pennsylvania and sued the train
company in a New York court, the
Supreme Court of the United States6 held
that: (a) unless the matter is governed by
the u.S. Constitution or federal statutes,
federal courts must apply the applicable
state law; (b) neither Congress nor the fed-

eral courts have the power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable to
a state; and (c) there is no general federal
common law. Thus, when exercising
jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship, federal courts must apply state
substantive law. This means that state law,
whether legislative or judicial in origin, is
to be applied to issues concerning the
validity, revocability and enforceability of
contracts.? The states are free to regulate
the use of intellectual property in any
manner not inconsistent with federal law
on the subject; state law is not displaced
merely because the contract relates to
intellectual property. Where a federal
court acquires jurisdiction of a dispute
involving a patent license based upon a
diversity of citizenship, the federal court
must look to the law of the state in which
the court sits. Federal patent law is not
applicable in actions for the breach of a
patent license. 8
While Erie told us that there is no general federal common law - no national common law in the United States distinct from
the common law which each state has
adopted for iteslf9 - it did not say that there
is no common law in force generally
throughout the United States. There still
exists the need and authority in limited
areas for federal courts to develop what
has come to be known as "federal common law."!O Federal common law exists in
those areas where Congress has given the
courts the power to develop substantive
law or where the rights, obligations or
interests of the United States are intimately involved. 11 When there is an overriding
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federal interest in the need for a uniform
rule of decision, the federal courts will
fashion federal common law. 12
The Constitution and the federal statutes
dealing with a general subject are the
prime sources of federal policy on the subject and may also be viewed as a starting
point for ascertaining the federal common
lawY Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the
Constitution and the Federal Patent Act14.
foster the federal patent policy.

IT
FEDERAL PATENT POLICY
The federal patent system was set up to
"promote the progress of ... the useful
arts by securing for limited times to ...
inventors the exclusive right to their .,.
discoveries;"15 requiring the full and free
competition in the use of ideas which are
a part of the public domain, while allowing limited rights of exclusion for subject
matter of United States patents. 16 The purpose of the system is: (1) to foster and
reward invention; (2) to promote the disclosure of inventions to stimulate further
innovations and to permit the public to
practice the invention once the patent
expires; and (3) to delineate the stringent
requirements for patent protection to
assure that ideas in the public domain
remain there for the free use of the public.
The requirements for obtaining a patent
are strictly observed, and when the patent
has been issued the limitation on its exercise are equally strictly enforced. 17
The federal courts will not hesitate to
completely override established state law
as it applies to the licensing of U.S. patents
when the judiciary believes that such laws
inhibit or conflict with the public policy
of the patent system. 18 The courts have
gone so far as to hold the Erie Doctrine l9
inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision in which the policy of the law is so
dominated by the sweep of federal statutes
that legal relations in those areas must be
deemed as governed by federallaw. 20 The
Seventh Circuit in UNARCO Industries,
Inc. v. Kelly Company, 21 held that:
[a] patent monopoly conferred by federal statute as well as the policy perpetuating this monopoly, so effects the
licensing of patents, and the policy
behind such licensing is so intertwined
with the sweep of federal statutes, that
any question with respect [to a patent
license] must be governed by federal
law. 22
In intellectual property, as in other
fields, the question of whether state law is
preempted by federal law "involves a con-

sideration of whether [the state] law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress."23 If it does not, the
state law governs.

m
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
OF LICENSING

A.LEAR,INCv.ADKINS
The landmark decision of Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins24 held that private patent licensing
contracts between individuals, with or
without the approval of the State, cannot
be allowed to frustrate "federal patent
policy ."25 In section III of its opinion, the
Court disregarded the Erie Doctrine and
reviewed the "competing demands" of
common law contracts and federal patent
law and ruled in favor of federal law ,26 burying the "general rule" of licensee estoppel
that had been a vital doctrine for over
ninety years,27 and preempting the common law of contracts.
In Lear, an engineer named John Adkins
was hired by Lear in January, 1952 to help
them invent a better gyroscope. Mr.
Adkins succeeded and filed a patent
application in February, 1954. In September, 1955, Lear and Akins executed a formal licensing agreement for the use of
Adkins' gyroscopes. In 1957, Adkins had
yet to receive a patent on his invention and

Court30 and reversed by the United States
Supreme Court.
This far reaching and potentially controversial decision of the Supreme Couit
held that: (a) a licensee is not estopped to
contest the validity of a licensed patent; (b)
the licensor can not enforce the royalty
provision of the contract; and, (c) upon
proving invalidity of the licensed patent, a
licensee is released from its royalty obligations retroactively from the date that the
patent was issued. 31 The rationale for this
decision is based upon federal patent
policy.
1. LICENSEE ESTOPPEL
Before the Lear decision, the doctrine of
licensee estoppel had been valid law for
more than one hundred years.J2 The doctrine states that a licensee was prevented
from challenging the validity of the
patents under which he was licensed. Two
Supreme Court decisions established
licensee estoppel as the general rule. In
United States v. Harvey Stee~ 33 there was a
provision in a licensing document with the
government that provided for the termination of royalties if the licensed patent was
invalidated. The Court rejected the
government's defense of patent invalidity
in a suit by the patent owner to collect
royalty payments, stating:

"purpose of the
system ... foster
and reward
invention ... "

[T]he United States [cannot] set up the
invalidity of the patent in this suit ....
The [royalty termination] proviso was
inserted, no doubt, on the assumption
that licensee, when sued for royalties,
is estopped to deny the validity of the
patent which he has been using, and to
give him the benefit of litigation by or
against third persons, notwithstanding
that rule. 34

so Lear stopped royalty payments to
Adkins on the large number of gyroscopes
being producing in its plant in Michigan.
Lear's action was based upon research
which revealed that the Adkins' invention
had been fully anticipated. Two years
later, in April, 1959,28 Lear terminated
royalty payments on the smaller number
of gyroscopes it was producing in its California plant. 29 In January, 1960, Adkins
was issued a patent on a narrowed claim.
Adkins immediately brought a lawsuit in
the California Superior Court for breach
of contract. Lear tried to raise patent invalidity as a defense but the court held that
the company was estopped from bringing
an invalidity defense because of its position
as a licensee. This decision was affirmed by
the holding of the California Supreme

Again in Automatic Radio /tfjg. Co. v.
Hazeltine Research Inc.,35 the Court stated
the "general rule is that the licensee under
a patent license agreement may not challenge the validity of the licensed patent in
a suit for royalties due under the contract."36
The Court in Lear held that the doctrine
of licensee estoppel was "so eroded" that
it could no longer be the general rule. The
Court ruled that the doctrine should only
be invoked in a narrow set of circumstancesY The Court weighed the
competing demands of the common law of
contracts, which would forbid the repudiation of a subsequently unsatisfactory bargain,38 against the federal law of patents,
which requires that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good
unless they are protected by a valid
patent. 39 Finding a true balance imp os-
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sible, the Court shifted the scales towards
the side of the licensee and "federal patent
policy": "Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh heavily when they are
balanced against the important public
interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in
reality a part of the public domain."40
Common law contract was overwhelmed
by "federal patent policy" and licensee
estoppel was dead and properly buried. 41

2. ROYALTIES
The Lear Court then proceeded to
decide whether federal patent policy
would be frustrated if the licensee was
required to make royalty payments
pendente lite. That was a question which
the Court had not been asked to answer.
Section 6 of the 1955 agreement between
Lear and Adkins provided for the payment
of royalties until such time as the "patent
. . . is held invalid."42 When weighed
against the overriding federal policies, the
Court held that this section of the parties'
contract had no authority and was unenforceable. The Court stated that enforcing
the contract and requiring the payment of
royalties during the time the validity of the
patent was being challenged in the courts
would be inconsistent with the aims of federal patent policy.H The Court went on to
hold that a licensor is prohibited from
judicially recovering all royalties accruing
after the issuance of the patent if the
licensee proves the license is invalid.
Ruling the other way would have
"[given] the licensor an additional
economic incentive to devise every conceivable dilatory tactic in an effort to
postpone the day of final judicial reckoning."H The effect of the alternative rule
would have been to replace the "muzzle,"
discouraging the licensee to challenge .the
validity of the patent, which the Court
had just removed when it eliminated the
doctrine of licensee estoppel. 45
The Court's ruling gave the licensee the
right to cease royalty payments at the time
it challenged the licensor's patent; and, it
deprived the licensor's right to enforce the
licensing agreement and recover the
unpaid royalties if the patent was ultimately declared invalid. The Court refused to
rule on the situation of royalties paid
before the patent issued.
IV
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
COMMON LAW OF LICENSING
A. WHAT TO DO WITH
ROYALTIES? • Cordis Corporation v.

Medtronic, Inc. 46

The Federal Circuit recently answered

several of the questions left unanswered by
Lear.47 In Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 48
Cordis filed suit in district court asking for
a declaratory judgment that the two
patents it licensed from Medtronic were
invalid. 49 Cordis also moved for the court
to order the establishment of an escrow
account into which Cordis would deposit
royalty payments due Medtronic pendente
lite and sought a preliminary injunction to
enjoin Medtronic from terminating the
licensing agreement for failure to make
royalty payments during the pendency of
the patent invalidity suit.50 The district
court granted the injunction and ordered
the establishment of an escrow account.
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded
the district court's decision.

"the court intimates
that it might allow
an escrow
accoun t ... "
The Federal Circuit found "no authority in Lear51 for establishing an escrow
account for royalties due pendente lite or
preliminarily enjoining a licensor from
cancelling the license agreement and, thus,
from counterclaiming for patent infringement when [a] material breach of the
license occurs."52 Cordis and a number of
district court decisions argued that with
such a decision:
[t]he speed and efficiency gained by
permitting the licensee to suspend
royalty payments would surely be lost
if nonpayment meant termination of a
license. [T]he threat of termination
would discourage the withholding of
royalties because . . . termination
would lay the licensee open to possibly
substantial liability for damages for
infringement and an injunction against
future use of the product whose patentability had been successfully established. Since few licensees will run the
risk, to permit the licensor to terminate the license agreement because
of nonpayment would enable it to
achieve indirectly what it quite
obviously cannot obtain directly - specific performance of the provision
requiring payment.53
The Cordis court, citing the Second Circuit in WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Allied

Chemical COrp.,54 and the Eighth Circuit
in Nebraska Engineering Corp. v. Shiv·
vers,55 held that the federal patent policy
encouraging prompt adjudication of
patent validity56 permits a licensee to cease
royalty payments during the patent invalidity suit but does not permit the licensee
to avoid the consequences of such a
breach. A licensee cannot enjoy the security of a licensing agreement 57 without making payments required under the
agreement. If the challenging licensee does
not want to risk forfeiture of the royalties
paid while litigating the validity of the
patent(s), the consequences of nonpayment, termination of the agreement
and exposure to a potential patent infringement suit must be accepted. In dicta, the
court intimates that it might allow an
escrow account if the licensee could show
that the licensor was financially irresponsible or might be judgment-proof at the end
of litigation.58
Cordis, the licensee, argued that absent
the injunctive relief it asked for, it would
suffer irreparable harm by forfeiting any
royalties paid pendente lite. The court distinguished the authority Cordis cited59 as
only prohibiting recovery of royalties paid
by the licensee when the challenge of the
patent was made by a third party. The
court, however, made no decision as to
which party would be entitled to royalties
paid or accrued pendente lite should the
patent be held invalid. 60
B. THE RIGHT TO CONTRACT
1. Universal Gym Equipment, Inc. v.

ERWA Exercise Equipment Ltd. 61

The most recent federal case applying
the Erie Doctrine to a patent licensing
action came out of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in September, 1987.
In Universal Gym Equipment, Inc. v.
ER WA Exercise Equipment Ltd.,62 the Federal Circuit held that patent law does not
preclude applications of state contract law
to provide relief for the breach of a patent
licensing contract. The plaintiff, Universal, and the defendants, ER WA and its subsidiary Global, manufacture and sell
weight lifting machines. Universal and
ER WA entered into a licensing agreement
in 1972 allowing ER W A to manufacture,
market and sell Universal machines in
Canada under Universal's trademark in
return for the payment of royalties. The
agreement contained a clause prohibiting
ERWA from using any features, designs,
technical information or said know-how
of the Universal equipment in any future
manufacturing activities after a termination of the contract. 63 The day after
Universal terminated the agreement,
Global began making and selling exercise
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machines which Universal claimed infringed upon its patent. The district court
found that Global's machines did not infringe; however, the court also ruled that
the defendants had breached the 1972 agreement and awarded damages to Universal.
On appeal, Global argued that the district court improperly upheld the agreement contrary to the doctrine set out by
the Supreme Court in Sea~ Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffil CO.,64 and Compeo Corp. v. DtryBrite Lighting, Inc. 6S In its argument
Global stated "that when a publicly
available article is unprotected by a patent
or copyright, state law may not f0rbid
others from making that article."66
Global also asserted that the holdings of
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bkron COrp.,67 and
Lear Inc. v. Adkins, 68 support the argument
that federal patent law preempts state law
that grants equivalent protection. The
court held that the application of state law
upholding the contract, which contained a
provision for relief for a breach of the contract, did not conflict with federal law. 69
The court found that Global's argument
applied those cases too broadly; the only
broad language in these cases that would
support the argument was taken out of
context. Focusing on the facts and the
holdings of Sea~ Compeo and Lear, the
court distinguished the present case. The
rationale of Sears and Compeo was that
patent law has prerequisites and limitations for the granting of a patent.
To allow a state by use of its laws of
unfair competition to prevent the copying of an article which represents too
slight an advance to [meet the prerequisites] and be patented would be to
permit the state to block off from the
public something which federal law
said belongs to the public.70

Sears and Compeo involved the compatibility of federal patent law and the application of state unfair competition law to prevent copying of an unpatented product of
a company that had no contractual relations with the copier.7 1 The issue in
Universal was the validity of the contract
between the parties and the contract's
compatability, not the state law under
which the contract was created, with federal patent law.
The court went on to address the
relevance of the holding in Lear,72 that in
order to eliminate the threat to the free use
of ideas already in the public domain
which an invalid patent represents, a
patent licensee is not estopped from challenging the validity of the licensed patent.
The issue before the Supreme Court in
Lear involved a question totally unrelated

to the issue in Universal 73 The only
applicable case Global cited was
Kewana!, 74 where the Supreme Court held
that federal patent law did not preempt
state trade secret law and the remedies it
provides for breach of a confidential agreement. In the present case, the Court distinguished the question "whether the patent
law precludes the application of state law
to validate and award damages for a
licensee's breach" of a contract, from the
question raised in Sears and Compco,
whether relief under a state's unfair competition law for copying an unpatented
article is barred by federal patent law.7 5
This court's decision affirmed the power
that the licensor and licensee have to contract, to limit their right to take action
they would otherwise have had. Such a
private contract is nullified by the
Sears/Compeo doctrine only if enforcement of the contract would conflict with
federal patent policy. Since their is no conflict in applying state law to provide
damages for a breach of the agreement,
patent law does not preclude the application of state law.76

2. Aronson v. Quick Point
Pencil Company77
The Universal court cites Aronson v.
Quick Point Pencil CO./8 as authority for
applying state law which uphold the right
of the parties in a contract to limit their
rights to take action. Relying on Kewanee
Oi~ the Court in Quick Point held that the
states were free to regulate the use of
intellectual property that "I?ay or may

HKewanee ... held
that federal patent
law did not preempt
state trade secret
law ... "
not be patentable."79 In Quick Point, an
inventor, Ms. Aronson, had exclusively
licensed her invention, a key holder which
had yet to be patented,80 to the Quick
Point Pencil Co. for its manufacture and
sale. The royalty payments provided for in
the contract started at a rate of five percent
of the selling price per item but were to be
reduced to two and one-half percent, if,
within five years, a patent for the key
holder was not granted. The Patent Office

did not issue a patent within the five year
period81 and Quick Point reduced its
royalty payments accordingly. Quick
Point continued to pay the reduced royalties for fourteen years; however, when
sales began to decline from competition
Quick Point brought suit to have the
royalty agreement declared unenforceable.
The Court upheld the agreement because
the agreement did not conflict with federal
patent policy.82
Permitting
inventors
to
make
enforceable agreements licensing the use of
their invention in return for royalties in
fact provides additional incentive to
invent,8) and, as in this case, does not withdraw ideas from the public domain. The
idea was not in the public domain when
Quick Point obtained the license; it was
Quick Point's exploitation that placed the
idea there. Enforcing the agreement would
not prevent anyone from copying the key
holder; it merely requires Quick Point to
pay the consideration which it promised in
return for the use of the new device ena·
bling it to preempt the market. 84 The
Court found that enforcement of this royalty agreement was consistent with its earlier
case, Brulotte v. Thys CO.85 In Brulotte, it
was held that an obligation to pay royalties
in exchange for the use of a patented device
may not extend beyond the life of a patent.
The principle underlying this theory was
that someone may not use the leverage of a
patent monopoly to negotiate royalty payments beyond the life of the monopoly.86
In Quick Point, no "patent leverage" was
used. In fact, the extended payment plan
was contingent upon no patent issuing. The
Court stated that:
[e]nforcement of these contractual
obligations, freely undertaken in
arm's-length negotiation and with no
fixed reliance on a patent or a probable
patent grant will 'encourage invention
in areas where patent law does not
reach, and will prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the
discovery and exploitation of his
invention. Competition is fostered and
the public is not deprived of the use of
valuable, if not quite patentable, invention.'87
Allowing an inventor to negotiate royalty
payments from a manufacturer for the
opportunity to be the first in the market is
not barred by federal patent policy.88
The apparent key to the situation, when
the application of state law is denied, is to
see when the enforcement of an agreement
under state law is inconsistent with the
purposes of the federal patent system. It is
the federal policy not to interfere with
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someone's freedom to contract so long as
it is clear that the subject matter of the
contract is not dependent on federally
granted patent rights, even though the possibility of patent· rights were secondarily
involved in the contract.

v. FEDERAL LEGISlATION
Federal common law is resorted to in the
absence of an applicable act of Congress.
Because a federal court is compelled to
consider federal questions which cannot be
answered from federal statutes alone, a federal court must sometimes apply federal
common law. But a federal court is subject
to the dominant authority of Congress.
When Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision resting on
federal common law the need for such an
unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal
courts disappears. 89
In his January, 1987 "State of the Union
Address," President Reagan announced his
intention to make proposals to Congress
to enhance America's competitiveness
through statutory and regulatory reforms
and a harder stance against unfair trade
practices.90 In February, Congress introduced legislation in both houses embracing
the President's "competitiveness package." The Omnibus Intellectual Property
Rights ImprO'lJement Act of 198711 contains
a number of proposals which would codify
and eliminate the need for a number of the
previously discussed cases.
Section 3106 would add section 296 to
the Patent Act as stated:
(a) A licensee shall not be estopped
from asserting in a judicial action the
invalidity of any patent for which the
licensee has obtained a license. Any
agreement between the parties to a
patent license agreement which purports to bar the licensee from asserting
the invalidity of any licensed patent
shall be unenforceable as to that provision.
(b) Any patent license agreement may
provide for a party or parties to the
agreement to terminate the license if
the licensee asserts in a judicial action
invalidity of the licensed patent, and, if
the licensee has such a right to terminate, the agreement may further
provide that the licensee's obligations
under the agreement shall continue
until final and unappealable determination of invalidity is reached or
until the license is terminated. Such an
agreement shall not be unenforceable
as to such provisions on the grounds
that such provisions are contrary to
federal law or policy.

Subsection (a) of the proposed statute
would codify the demise of the doctrine of
licensee estoppel that was effected by the
Supreme Court in Lear v. Adkins. 92 Subsection (b) however, subverts part of the
holding in Lear. The section would allow
a patent license to provide for the
licensee's obligations under the contract to
continue until the patent is finally declared
invalid or until the license is terminated;
such a provision was held unenforceable in

Lear.
Subsection (b) also embraces the decisions in Cordis and Universal The statute
would expand upon the decision in Cordis
allowing a licensor to terminate an agreement for nonpayment of royalties by allowing the parties to a licensing agreement
to provide for termination of the agreement when the licensee challenges the
validity of the licensed patent, even if the
licensee has not stopped making royalty
payments. The freedqm to provide for termination upon a patent challenge and for
royalty obligations to continue until final
resolution is a Congressional recognition
of the parties right to contract expressed in
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VI. CONCLUSION
America has grown to be a world power
in such a relatively short time partly due to
the competitive nature of its people. This
competitiveness has been stimulated and
nurtured by granting rewards for inventiveness, the rights specified in the Patent
Act. At times, however, the patent
owner's use· of these rights has been found
to transgress the federal patent policy.
Even seemingly legitimate uses of the
patent monopoly may be ruled as inconsistent with federal patent policy.
Where the legislature has failed to deal
with these transgressions, the federal courts
have developed federal common law. Federal common law was not abolished by the
Erie decision; in fact, in the field of patent
licensing agreements it is growing at a rapid
rate. The area of royalty payments appears
to be where the growth will be most abundant; there are still a number of questions
regarding royalties that have been raised
but not yet answered.
The newly proposed legislation is a sign
that Congress is aware of the need to
address these questions and more clearly
defme what "federal patent policy" is; and
thereby, decrease the need for the courts to
fill in the gaps.
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NOTES
1

The federal patent system was developed to:
foster and reward invention; to promote disclosure of inventions to stimulate further

invention; to permit the public to practice
the invention once the patent expires; and
to assure that ideas in the public domain
remain there for the free use of the public.
K/!'Wanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470 at 480-81 (1974).
There may be some risk involved if the purchase price of the patent is in some way
based upon a percentage of the sales of the
invention.
A patent owner may even grant a license
that is so exclusive that it includes a promise not to make, use or sell his or her own
invention.
For example: the license may be restricted
to one particular field of use or to a specified territory. The invention may have uses
in more than one field: domestic, industrial
or military. The patentee may limit a
license to one or more of such fields of use.
E.g., General Talking Pictures Corp. v.
Western Flec. Co., 304 U.s. 175, affd on
bearinl§ 305 U.S. 124, (1938). Section 261 of
the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. 261 (1982),
expressly provides for the granting of an
exclusive right under a patent "to the whole
or any specified part of the United States."
Such territorial restrictions do not preclude
an ultimate purchaser from using or reselling the invention elsewhere. E.g. United
States v. Bausch and Lomb Optical Co., 321
U.S. 707 (1944).
"Patent licenses are almost always embodied
in and are a part of a contract." Rosenberg,
P., Patent Law Fundamentals. Section
16.05[1] (2nd Ed. 1987 rev.). See, e.g.,
Westin?PotlSe Flee. and Mfg. Co. v. Tri·City
Radio Flec. Supply Co., 23 F.2d 628 (8th Cir.
1927). Addressing the issue of the reforming
of a patent licensing instrument to conform
with the intent of the parties, the court
stated that "a license to use a patent is a
contract." Westinghouse,.23 F.2d 628 at 632.
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
See, e.g., Perry v. 1bomas, 96 L Ed.2d 426
(1987); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken,
Inc., 444 F.Supp 648, 670, 197 U.S.P.Q. 342,
363 (D.S.C. 1977).
Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals, section 16.01[I][b] at 16-11 (2d ed. 1987) {citing
Willis Bros., Inc. v. Ocean Scallops, Inc., 356
F. Supp. 1151, 1154, 176 U.S.P.Q. 53, 55
(E.D.N.C. 1972».
Erie, supra. note 6; see also, KAnsas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1906); 16A Am. Jur. 2d
Common Law, sections 1 et seq. (1987).
Texas Indus. Inc. v. Rutkiijf Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630 (1981).

20

21

Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (applying federal common law in a case dealing
with water pol1ution in a body of water
bordered by four states).
IJ. See also, Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
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